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Since the partial collapse of the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia
(NEA), there has been a profound transformation of economic landscape in the
former centrally-planned economies—Mongolia, Russia and China. Despite a
broad spectrum of market-oriented economic policies being instituted and pro-
moted over the past few years, the results are mixed. Specifically, the economic
performance of Russia and Mongolia is far from satisfactory. Moreover, the
extensive change in economic system has not yet been completed. Although
such outcome is inevitable, a close examination of this transition effort may be
useful to reconsider the desirable policy objectives, outcomes and processes of
systemic transformation in these countries.
Against this background the objective of this paper is two fold. First, with
particular reference to the transition process in Mongolia, the paper intends to
review the industrial promotion policies that have been instituted since 1990.
Second, the paper aims to derive several relevant lessons from the Mongolian
experience in rethinking the industrial promotion policies for re-industrialization
in the transitional economies.
l. Changes of market conditions in external sector
By and large, the transformation to market-oriented economic system in
the NEA was started as the consequence of the collapse of the former Soviet
Union and CMEA regime. Mongolia was a typical example. Before 1990, Mongolia
had an extremely high dependent economic structure on the CMEA regime. For
instance, 95 percent of its international trade was carried out through the trans-
action with CMEA countries. However, the trade structure has changed rapidly
since 1990. Consequently, trade volume with former CMEA countries contracted,
while economic and military assistance from Russia were stopped.
Russian Far East (RFE) also encountered similar experience. After the col-
lapse of the division of labor structure between RFE and other regions in Rus-
sia—which arc mainly located at the western side of Ural Mountain, RFE’s
economy was isolated. Furthermore, North Korea also received tremendous
impact from the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
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Under such circumstances, what are the desirable economic policies to
promote the development of market-oriented? Systems in these countries? China
provides plausible alternative direction. China started to transform its centrally-
planned economy to the market-based one in the late 1970’s. The economic
transformation process is mainly driven by domestic market liberalization and
outward looking policies. Indeed, these policies provided a basis to rapid expan-
sion of export and attraction of enormous amount of foreign direct investment.
Consequently, China was able to achieve remarkably high growth-real GDP
growth a year was 10.2 percent between 1980 and 1995.
The population of Mongolia, RFR and North Korea is 2.3 millions, 8 mil-
lions and 20 millions, respectively. Thus, the size of the domestic market is too
small in comparison to China. Small domestic market inhibits economy of scale.
For this reason, setting up full set industrial structure is not feasible in those
economies. Rather, what is needed is the “Structural Specialization Policy”. Under
such framework, the industrial structure specialized on products which have
international comparative advantages in exports. Other necessary products are
complemented by imports.
Hi other words, Mongolia first needs to re-orientate its industrial structure
and economic relations to the former Soviet regime. Secondly, in medium and
long-term perspective, Mongolia should undertake structural transformation
for trade expansion to the market-oriented industrialized countries. For this pur-
pose, appropriate industrial policies, which includes export promotion policy
package, become extremely important.
2.Changes of the economic conditions; inflation
control and macro economic stabilization.
Hi Mongolia, import goods such as machinery components and oil from
Russia decreased rapidly after the collapse of the former USSR. This supply
shortage compounded with price liberalization induced high inflation in Mongolia.
Consequently, Mongolian national currency-tugrik, which was linked to trans-
ferable Russian ruble, had to be put into a new adjustment process. During this
transformation process, instead of the aid from former USSR, substantial amount
of economic •assistance from international organizations such as IMF, ADB and
developed countries like Japan and United States have been injected into the
Mongolian economy.
At the same time, however, the conditionality attached with- the   assis-
tance   from   international   organizations   exert tremendous pressure on Mongolia.
The purpose of the conditionality is to establish macro economic stabilization.
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As a result, strict control on money emission by hard budget constraint was
introduced. Evidently, this reform package was the most crucial point in the
Mongolian economic history.
3. Grope   for   new   market   system   and   the
realities   in Mongolian economy
At this stage, Mongolia has demonstrated strong efforts to transform its
economic system to a market-oriented one. Various regulations were liberalized,
international trade permission system was abolished, and fixed foreign exchange
system was replaced with floating exchange rate regime. In addition, regulations
on the prices were gradually modified, state owned enterprises were privatized
and stock exchange market was established in order to promote the develop-
ment of a market economy. Financial subsidies were heavily cut, the numbers of
administrative officers were reduced in order to improve budget deficit. In order
words, the effort to set up a small government was promoted.
The transition mentioned above seems to be very rational; however, when
this process is evaluated carefully, one can find many contradictions exist be-
tween the IMF-IBRD type of economic policies and the reality. IMF has a ten-
dency to recommend policies based on their tradition- neo-classical economic
theory, which they have fostered. That is, the priority of the IMF’s reform strat-
egy is to ensure macro stabilization through balanced budget, trade balance and
low inflation. One of the most important policy instruments in this reform pro-
gram is the monetary policy.
On the other hand, IBRD and ADB incline to recommend policies that are
to promote project based finance smoothly and successfully because they are
“the bank”. The key issue whether the projects are successful or not depends
on the internal rate of return (IRR). In other words, rational calculation of IRR is
required for each project. The condition to undertake rational calculation of IRR
depends on the market mechanism which operates under the premise of perfect
competition. For this reason, international multilateral financial institutions as-
sert strongly to the abolishment of regulations, minimum administrative organi-
zations, institution and state-owned enterprises because these elements strongly
distort market or price mechanism. In other word, this is a “free market, minimalist
state” of neo-classical paradigm.
4. Scrap without built
One of the fundamental problems on the recommendations mentioned
above is the following. The policies for macro economic stabilization and small
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government give raise to the contraction of production, which as a result, cre-
ates a situation where the economy is scraped without built.
4-1. Privatization: an assessment
The mass privatization of the state-owned enterprises was carried out by
the instantaneous approach which had been used in Russia and East European
countries. This privatization strategy encompasses four stages. First, a crude
assessment of the total asset of the targeted state-owned enterprises is carried
out. Second, privatization vouchers (voucher value is derived from dividing
total assets by the total number of the population) are distributed to each citi-
zen. Third, the citizens select one or two enterprises in exchange of the vouch-
ers, whereby a citizen group which bided the highest price acquired the owner-
ship of those enterprises. In the last stage, stock exchange is created to facilitate
the exchange /flow of vouchers, which in turn is expected to bring about the
concentration of ownerships. However, the real situation differs significantly
from the intended objective of such mass privatization program. For instance,
ten or twenty thousand share holders exist in each enterprise. The problem of
who actually holds the final management responsibilities remains either unre-
solved or ambiguous. Most importantly, such “giveaways” privatization cre-
ated many private share holders without the necessary capital to rebuild the
privatized enterprises for economy recovery. Rather, many privatized enterprises
have had to take over a large amount of debt to the banking sector as a result of
the loans accumulated before privatization process. Consequently, many enter-
prises are confronting with a severe situation where they are even unable to
service the interest of the loan. Money supply control policy that has been
instituted in order to attain macro stability and low inflation rule out any oppor-
tunities in which enterprises can borrow working capital for the continuous
production activities. As a consequence, most enterprises have to sell out prod-
ucts which are stockpiled. After they received some money from the sale, then
they procure the raw materials, and then re-start the production line. When
some volume of goods has been produced, the production line is halted in order
to sell the goods for input procurement. Furthermore, this typical vicious cycle
in the real sector is compounded with many other impediment factors such as
electric power shortage, machinery parts shortage and so on that inhibit the
production activities.
4-2. Agricultural sector
The collapse of the former state-owned big scale agricultural farms gives
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rise to inefficient use of capital inputs such as tractors, trucks, chemical fertilizer,
and agricultural chemical. As a result, for example, in 1995 the production level of
wheat declined to 40 percent of 1990’s level. In the nomadic sector, .privatization
of the ownership of the livestock gave nomadic people strong incentives to
increase number of livestock’s. However, because the collapse of the former
state-owned distribution, system, nomadic people can not find the appropriate
channel to bring livestock related materials (such as meat, milk, , leather, wool) to
the processing factories which are located in the urban area. Consequently, the
stock of the raw materials inevitably increases and cash revenue decreases in
rural area.
4-3. Government sector
Cutting financial expenditure reduced labor incentives of the administra-
tive officials. Their living standard has deteriorated, whereas the corruption is
becoming increase severe. Furthermore, salaries to the teachers are delayed,
there by brought about regular strike movements in the local area, which in. turn
forced many schools to close for long duration. The targeted area for the reduc-
tion of financial expenditure has been extended to»the staffs of the ODA related
sectors. For this reason, ODA approval procedure is often delayed. The num-
bers of ODA projects that are forced to be terminated by such financial con-
straint have increased. In addition, research institutions whose aim is to inquire
economic and social policies are confronted with the acute shortage of research
funds. Thus, personnel are leaving research institutions have accelerated. The
ability of the statistical sector in the government has also declined because of
the decreasing staffs. Therefore, the reliability of the statistical data and the
capacities of the economic research which are of utmost important to the policy
making process have also deteriorated. Furthermore, the downsizing of the so-
cial security and welfare systems has also resulted to the decline in living stan-
dard of the most poverty group day by day.
5. What are the bottlenecks?
What are the causes which produce difference between the market-ori-
ented policies and the realities? It seems to me that the thinking of the interna-
tional financial organizations is not totally incorrect. It is very clear that any
reform policies can not achieve their policy objectives in the state of distorted
macro economic conditions. The concept of a small government is also correct
under the hard budget constrains. However, the problem is that there are no
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policies other than the two policies-the macro stabilization policy and small
government oriented policy. IMF is confident that market mechanism can be
created in a short time by the shock therapy. This fundamental belief lies on the
assumption that once market mechanism is set up, the economy automatically
induces development. This is a too simple economic thought!
Many other appropriate policy measures are required to coexist with the
macro stabilization policies in order to produce real economic development. For
example, institution building (such as creation of private and public organiza-
tions that are capable of carrying out investment, trade, competition and tech-
nology policies) and capacity building on human resource development. In
addition, it needs a long time to develop and nurture the market mechanism.
5-1. Priority production strategy
Priority production strategy encourages the government to allocate the
scarce financial resources to those important industrial sectors and yet be able
to maintain a money supply level that keeps macro economic stable as well. The
twin objectives of allocation of financial resources for priority production and
macro economic stabilization can be achieved by the following approach. The
central bank is required to check the financial structure of each commercial bank
in order to identify unnecessary financial allocation to the sectors which are not
so important for the economy and have no urgent financial needs. Instead, the
central bank orders to strengthen the financial allocation to the sectors which
are very important and have urgent financial needs for the country concerned.
This is one of the policies which are urgently needed in Mongolia.
5-2. Real interest rate policy
Another useful policy instrument to consolidate the working capital for
enterprises is the real interest rate policy. It is true that the real interest rate must
be positive in order to achieve profitability in the banking activities. Too high
that the real interest rate such as 30 percent a year in Mongolia in 1995 was a
clear reflection of economic rationale-profit maximization of banking activity, but
it has no practical implication. Thus, what is essential is to decrease the rate as
low as possible for the selected important industry or enterprise. In fact, high
interest rate policy represses the demand for finance and it deteriorates profit
structure in the banking sector. As a result, this leads to a discreet attitude in the
banking sector, and inevitably, it prompted the financial institutions to seek
higher interest rate. This is clearly a vicious cycle.
53
 Number 5, 1998The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
Moreover, there is further ground to reconsider the assertion of positive
real interest rate (nominal interest rate minus inflation rate). In general, inflation
rate itself is produced in an average rate basis. Inflation rates in different sectors
are different from each other. Thus, comprehensive financial policies to encom-
pass the inflation rate in each individual sector must be promoted.
5-3. Investment policy for improved efficiency
Market mechanism is a basis for optimum resource allocation. This state-
ment is true if and only if the other things being equal. In other words, if the
other things change, there is a high possibility that this statement is not valid.
Suppose there is one industrial sector or enterprise. If the government promotes
a policy which supply good infrastructure or new technology to this selected
sector / enterprise, then it will help to strengthen the competitiveness? It should
be noted here that the efficiency is different before and after the selective inter-
vention. Thus, before or after the policy, the government makes them throne to
the market mechanism, there are other instruments, such as appropriate invest-
ment policies, to improve efficiency. Timely government support through in-
vestment policy is important to ensure effective operation of reforming enter-
prises in market-oriented environment.
5-4. Small but effective government
We have to reconsider the small government oriented policy too. If small
government plays a small role, then it only means weak government. Given such
situation, the economic development will be doubtful. Thus, a small government
must be sufficiently effective on nurturing market mechanism on one hand,
while promoting long-term appropriate resource allocation policy which is dif-
ferent from the short-term resource allocation mechanism in the market.
5-5. Human resource development
To ensure effective government and enhanced capacity to carry out com-
prehensive industrial promotion policies, human resource development of the
administrative personnel is of utmost importance. Short-term training in abroad
is one of the most effective approach to improve the administrative and devel-
opment management capacity of bureaucrats. But, it should be noted that, from
the Mongolian experience, two or three weeks training in abroad is insufficient
to fully understand the function of market economy. Contrary, there is a possi-
bility that the governmental officials may accept market economy superficially,
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while do not approve of it in their true mind and protest negatively in strength-
ening the market mechanism. More importantly, if we lack of the human resource
development policies, there is a high possibility in which small government is
transformed into an inefficient and bureaucratic one immediately, which in turn
impedes development process. The area of the human resource development
program does not solely confine to the administrative level. It has to encompass
other fields such as human resource development in the enterprise level. Par-
ticularly, government should provide human resource development support to
those promising enterprises which are facing transformation obstacles under
difficult economic conditions. For example, the government should facilitate the
enterprises to carry out the study of the experience in the much modernized
enterprises.
6. The lessons from other NEA countries
The experiences of economic development in Japan, South Korea and
China show the following lessons. That is, a growth sector has to be fostered in
the economy by the appropriate industrial policies at the very initial stage of
development. Japanese and South Korean experiences also clearly demonstrate
that as the economy continues its expansion, various problem or weak points in
the economy will be overcame and which in turn help to foster the market.
China   also   demonstrates   some   useful   lessons.   For example, the core
of the growth sector was formed by the private enterprises which were founded
by the new entrepreneurs in China. Since the introduction of economic reform
and open door policies, small size enterprises in rural area, that is, township and
village enterprises have been expanding rapidly. On the other hand, the share of
the state owned-enterprise output in GDP has been decreasing. Although the
inefficient management of the state-owned enterprises still remains a big chal-
lenge in the on-going reform process, China has sufficient time and strength to
cope with this problem at present. The way which the problems are postponed
is useful under the specific condition. Chinese experience in economic reform
provides   many   useful suggestions to the transitional economies in NEA,
especially North Korea in the near future.
7. What have to be done?
7-1. Multilateral international financial institutions
International financial organizations have to re-examine their decision
making process. The experts in IMF, IBRD and ADB know that there is no similar
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economic structure and same economic mechanism through developing econo-
mies in the world.   But,   these   experts   can not present individual case
according to the unique situation in each individual country to the board of
directors which is represented by many countries. If the experts bring up indi-
vidual case, the board will turn into chaos and no consensus in policies making
will be able to constitute. For this reason, the staffs of international financial
institutions have to bring up minimum sized and easy consensus oriented pro-
posal to the board. As a result, when experts visit the developing country con-
cerned, they often bring tremendous volume but simplified manual. Most of the
time, they promote customized procedure to study based on the same manual in
another developing countries. Even the country economists, they only visit the
country concerned for a short time and in a good weather seasons. Also, the
study results often neglect factors which are beyond the coverage of such
manual? Thus, international financial organizations have to make more efforts to
reach correct understanding of the total economic situation in the country con-
cerned.
7-2. Bilateral assistance
ODA donor countries sometimes have a different philosophy about eco-
nomic policies with that of the international organizations. For example, Japan
and South Korea understand that nurturing market mechanism takes long time.
These countries understand that macro economic policies are necessary but not
sufficient enough to control the turbulence in the market. Therefore, direct ad-
ministrative guidance is necessary in the transition period. However, their phi-
losophy does not reflect in the real world. The reasons are as follows.
First, these donor countries are also important members of the board in the
international organizations. For this reason, they are not able to deny easily the
proposals which have approved in the board meetings. Second, ODA promo-
tion procedures are usually preceded by the cooperation among different minis-
tries, particularly in Japan. It is not easy to reach national consensus between
implementing ministries on specific ODA related policies in a short period.
In general, political leaders in transitional economies are confronted with
difficult problems day by day. When they feel a difficulty in a policy making
process, they want to seek the opinions from the international organizations
and donor countries. Because IMF, IBRD and ADB are organizations which
have a clear hierarchy, they can correspond Xo the questions quickly. On the
other hand, donor countries can not cope with those questions in a short time.
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As political leaders in developing countries are being irritated by waiting the
answer, it is quite natural that they inevitable have to rely on the opinions
coming from international organization as an important advisory input without
carefully consultations.
So, for donor countries, improving efficiency on the decision making pro-
cess for economic assistance, in particular, the policy level cooperation is needed.
Also for the government of the developing countries, it is needed that an atti-
tude which consider or discuss the proposals from outside of the countries in a
calm frame of mind.
8. The necessity for correct understanding of the industrial
Industrial policy is one of the most effective measures to enhance the
strength of the strategic industrial sector for economic development under the
conditions which market mechanism can not function smoothly. Here, it is to be
emphasized that industrial policy is not a policy which denies market system.
Japanese experience suggests that the industrial policy which has empha-
sized on market information is a successful one. For example protection- policies
through import quota and high tariff barrier for infant automobile industry con-
tributed to the prosperity of the industry in nowadays. This policy predicted
future demand expansion of automobile despite small demand that had existed
in those days. On the other hand, protection policies for aluminum refinery
industry after the first oil shock resulted to a complete failure. This was because
the policy did not anticipated the rapidly increase in oil price would affect en-
ergy prices which directly constituted about 80 percent share of the total refin-
ery cost.
Japanese experience mentioned above seems to give valuable lessons to
the present NEA countries. The essential point is the ability to predict the dy-
namic change of industrial policies is being interpreted one snidely -state inter-
vention to the market mechanism. The term of intervention involves bad or
malicious meaning. It should be emphasized that industrial policy is not an
intervention. Thus, we have to keep the distinction between industrial policy
and state intervention.
Further, one dangerous trend should be carefully considered here. That is,
when one policy produced a wrong result, people like to interpret them as a
mistake of the way of thinking of the whole industrial policy itself. Following
example suggests some lessons.
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Former Mongolian government prohibited the export of cashmere raw
materials. This is because export prohibition was thought to be useful for the
domestic cashmere processing industry in terms of value added processed prod-
ucts for exports are profitable to the macro economy. On the contrary, ADBJMF
and IBRD all opposed severely to such export restriction.
The result was as follows. Under the export restriction policy, cashmere
industry did not develop as expected. Consequently the nomadic people who
are living remotely from big city or center of the each state (amok) was not able
to sale their cashmere related raw materials because of export restriction policy.
As a result, poverty in the rural area was aggravated.
Newly established government liberalized cashmere related raw material
export because they could not stand up to the pressure from international orga-
nization. ADB, IMF and IBRD asserted as follows. After all, cashmere industry
did not developed under the export prohibition policies. This means that the free
trade policy is better than the export ban. On the other hand, there are two kind
of different opinions in the Mongolian government. First, this policy change is
dangerous because the possibility of the collapse of the cashmere industry has
increased. Second, the cashmere industry did not develop as execrated is a fact.
Does this imply that the industrial policies whose concept brought from Japan,
South Korea and China is not so conform to Mongolia?
What was wrong? The problem is that Mongolian cashmere industrial
policy was constituted only by the export ban. Other necessary policies such as
low interest financial policy, new machinery with high technology, import or
lease policies, improvement of procurement system policy, were not introduced
to the industry.
Under the present situation, export liberalization on the cashmere materi-
als is justified because the policy can contribute to assist poverty of nomadic
people in the rural area out of difficulty. However, when promotion policies for
nurturing the cashmere industry have been put in place, then it is rational for the
government to restart the export ban policy.
Conclusion
The economies in NEA are undergoing a dynamic change everyday. In
this situation, to make decision on the appropriate policies and put them into
practice are highly difficult task. The important point of view is that policy
makers have to keep their mind cool and must not regard the industrial policy as
one which is opposed to market mechanism. Furthermore, the policy makers
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must not promote policies hastily. Each policy measures must be carefully scru-
tinized and be organized into appropriates a policy package. In addition, they
have to keep an important point that any appropriate policy needs appropriate
timing. On the decision making process, it is a normal way that the government,
international organization and donor countries pose each opinions, but the
government has to make a final decision. For this purpose, even though a small
government under the hard budget constraint, the sector in which policy mak-
ing, decision making and its proceeding, have to be strengthened. Therefore,
International. Financial organizations and donor countries need new as-
sistance scheme which could contribute to the improvement of the policy mak-
ing capacity in the developing countries in NEA.
